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Abstract
Turkey’s recent venture involving the construction of hundreds of small-scale hydropower projects is a signifi-
cant trend, both in regard to its contribution to Turkey’s hydroelectricity production and the social and
environmental impact of these projects at the local level. Turkey’s hydropower policy was premised on a conven-
tional understanding of water driven by science, technology, and the market. This approach, however, does not
seem to have paid sufficient attention to the socio-ecological characteristics of water. Developing policies from
a solely technical perspective creates political, economic, and cultural inequalities that adversely affect the
social and ecological realm. Hence, this paper attempts to deconstruct the design, execution, and aftermath of
Turkey’s small-scale hydropower policy through the lens of the hydro-social cycle. We aim to explain various
dimensions of Turkey’s small-scale hydropower program in a conceptual framework that merges the concept of
the hydro-social cycle with patterns of distributive environmental justice. We find that state-led, techno-centric
and market-oriented approaches to water instrumentalize a rhetoric of justice in order to justify the development
of small-scale hydropower ventures. Our analysis, however, demonstrates Turkey’s small-scale hydropower policy
falls short of delivering on its promise of distributive justice in three relevant dimensions, namely the distribution
of burdens and benefits, vulnerabilities, and responsibilities at local level.
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Water policyIntroduction
The development of water resources was one of the key sectors institutionalized in modern Turkey. Its
role in driving economic growth and social development has been constantly emphasized at the political
level. In particular, with the establishment of the water bureaucracy, Devlet Su Isleri (State Hydraulic2166/wp.2016.235
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R. C. Sayan and A. Kibaroglu / Water Policy 00 (2016) 1–162Works, DSI, following the Turkish acronym hereafter) in 1954, hydropower projects (HPs) became an
integral part of Turkey’s socio-economic development. As part of the official five-year development
plans, the Turkish state has invested in the construction of hundreds of large-scale dams and reservoirs,
as well as launching its mega hydro-development project entitled the Southeastern Anatolia Project
(GAP, following the Turkish acronym) for the benefit of the entire country (Tigrek & Kibaroglu,
2011). Turkey’s ambitious program to develop large-scale hydropower has been frequently praised at
political and administrative levels, while, in general, also backed by society due to its tangible contri-
butions to the livelihoods and socio-economic development of the people (Adaman et al., in press).
While hydropower investments continue to be an integral part of Turkey’s development program, the
neoliberalization of the global political economy and the rise of a sustainability discourse at the inter-
national level have culminated in a paradigm shift. With these transformations, state-led large-scale HPs
began to be discouraged worldwide due to their socio-environmental impacts (World Commission on
Dams [WCD], 2000). This shift also loomed large on Turkey’s hydropower policies, as international
financing, through organizations like the World Bank, were an important incentive to and resource
for Turkey’s HPs. Reflections of these global trends on Turkey’s water management marked the start
of a new phase in Turkey’s economy and energy policies during the 2000s (Kibaroglu et al., 2009).
This phase has seen a shift with the construction of hundreds of small-scale run-of-river HPs planned
by DSI and constructed and operated by private sector companies (Islar, 2012a). The small-scale HPs
with a capacity of 10 MW or below typically divert water from a point close to the source of the river (at
an appropriate altitude) through canals or pipes to the powerhouse where electricity is generated, sub-
sequently releasing the processed water to the river course (Abbasi & Abbasi, 2011). This process does
not involve the construction of huge reservoirs or dams to store large amounts of water.
According to official records, 1,497 HPs have been planned across Turkey, 422 of which are already
in operation while the rest are in the stages of planning and construction (DSI, 2014a). In justifying their
policies, the government and its water bureaucracy have consistently promoted these projects as renew-
able energy sources and emphasized their contributions to Turkey’s socio-economic development (Islar,
2012b; Erensu, 2013; Adaman et al., in press). Traditionally, the Turkish public has been overwhel-
mingly supportive of the government’s water management practices, particularly because large-scale
HPs have tangibly contributed to their livelihoods, providing power, irrigation, and jobs. In contrast,
the small-scale HPs, whose economic impacts have been less tangible, have produced an unusual
public backlash as they were perceived to be serving not the public’s interest but those of a circle of
private sector companies and state elites (Hamsici, 2010; CounterCurrent, 2011; Union of Chambers
of Turkish Engineers & Architects [Turkiye Muhendis ve Mimar Odalari Birligi, TMMOB], 2011;
Eryilmaz, 2012; Islar, 2012a, 2012b; Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities & Trade
[EJOLT], 2015). Along with the perception of graft and corruption, these constructions have also
received backlash for the impact they have had on the environment, as the brooks and streams being
developed were integral to the locals’ livelihoods and their socio-cultural activities. Moreover, the
design, planning, and implementation of these HPs have drawn extensive criticism for their lack of
inclusion and transparency (Hamsici, 2010; EJOLT, 2015).
Hence, we probe into the central role of injustices hidden in the hydropower policies and discourses at
national and local levels in order to trace three different patterns of distributive environmental justice: (i)
burdens and benefits, (ii) vulnerabilities, and (iii) responsibilities. We will explore how socio-environ-
mental benefits and burdens are distributed among stakeholders, namely suppliers (i.e. private
companies and the State) and users (i.e. local people). Moreover, we analyze how locals have
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tangle how the responsibilities are distributed between stakeholders in terms of obtaining water use
rights and the economic and social returns of water development.
Playing a key role in this analysis are two competing frameworks to water – technocratic and socio-
political. In the technocratic framework, water is viewed as a material resource and reduced to its phys-
ical properties in the hydrological cycle (Bakker, 2007; Molle, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2009; Linton,
2010). Subsequently, this framework focuses on state-led, techno-centric and market-oriented
approaches of hydraulic bureaucracies at the national and global levels ‘to govern and manage water
for human benefit’ (Baker, 2013). In contrast, more recent literature, like Linton & Budds (2014)
and Swyngedouw (2015), argue for a socio-political approach that construes water as inherently fluid
and treats it as the vehicle of a complex web of social relations, flowing in not only a hydrological
but also a hydro-social cycle. According to this approach, water and society are intertwined with
each other and they ‘make and remake each other over space and time’ (Linton & Budds, 2014).
Building on this dichotomy, this paper attempts to deconstruct Turkey’s small-scale hydropower
policy by focusing on the dissonance between the hydrological and hydro-social cycles. The paper
articulates Turkey’s hydropower process and its socio-environmental impacts to reinforce the social
dimensions of water and the hydro-social cycle and, most importantly, discuss how issues of (in)equal-
ities, or broadly justice notions, are central to the hydro-social cycle. On this basis, it argues that the
social dimensions of the hydro-social cycle can be deepened and broadened when explicitly articulated
through the concept of distributive environmental justice.
The paper starts with an overview of Turkey’s water policy, explaining how the country’s hydro-
power policy was shaped and justified in a technocratic framework that limits water to its
hydrological properties as a source of energy. After a conceptual discussion and description of method-
ology, the following section sheds light on how this conceptual approach reverberates at the local level,
looking at first-hand information and empirical evidence obtained through fieldwork at the Kargi-Yanik-
lar HP in Turkey’s Western Mediterranean region. Overall, the paper’s objective is to demonstrate how
the design and practice of hydropower policies alter patterns of environmental justice and discuss
whether the notion of justice can be internalized in the hydro-social cycle.An overview: implications of Turkey’s pivot from large-scale to small-scale HPs
The technocratic approach to water policy is premised on the assumption that state-led, techno-cen-
tric, and market-oriented practices would yield a fair and equitable distribution of water resources, both
socially and environmentally. It is on this basis that it justifies its reduction of water to its hydrological
properties. This section problematizes this approach, tracing (i) how contrasting conceptualizations of
water have an impact on Turkey’s water policy, (ii) how water policy alters patterns of justice and injus-
tice, and (iii) how water is mediated as a means of socio-environmental injustice in the country.
Turkey’s water management policies and practices differentiate over time. From the 1920s to the
1950s, Turkey was undergoing a process of state consolidation efforts, which included the mobilization
of financial, administrative, and technical resources to assess the country’s hydropower potential (Tigrek
& Kibaroglu, 2011). In 1954, water management was effectively institutionalized with the establishment
of the country’s dedicated water management agency – DSI – which led the systematic planning and
implementation of hydraulic projects in Turkey. DSI was a technocratic institution dominated by
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approached water policy from a distinctly technocratic perspective.
Between the 1960s and 1980s, DSI’s policies, reinforced by the five-year development plans of the State
Planning Organization, led to massive water development projects in Turkey, mainly for hydropower gen-
eration and agricultural development (Tigrek & Kibaroglu, 2011). These state-led development schemes
reached their apex in the 1980s, when Turkey integrated its existing water projects in the Euphrates and
Tigris river basin into amega-plan that comprised one of theworld’s largest multidimensional water devel-
opment projects: the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). Alongside the country’s broader objectives
regarding hydropower generation and agricultural productivity, the GAP also aimed to improve the
socio-economic condition in Turkey’s economically underdeveloped southeast. Although the GAP had
a hybrid agenda with both social and technical objectives, the cadres working on its planning and
implementation were acculturated to the Turkish water bureaucracy’s technocratic approach. Driven by
a top-down policy process that failed to fully appreciate the complexities behind the region’s socio-econ-
omic underdevelopment, the GAP mostly achieved its technical objectives in terms of hydropower
generation and agricultural productivity but failed short of its social agenda (Kibaroglu, 2002).
Starting in the 1980s, the transformations in the global political economy have led to an increasing
neoliberalization of Turkey’s water policy (Kibaroglu et al., 2009). In this context, the role of DSI and
the State in water management has been redefined from a principal contractor to a market regulator. This
neoliberal shift placed a premium on private sector participation and resulted in policy changes like the
transition from large-scale HPs that very few private sector companies had the financial heft and tech-
nical know-how to successfully execute to small-scale HPs that are relatively easier to fund, build, and
manage (Harris & Islar, 2013). Indeed, since the 2000s, these projects have become the norm in Tur-
key’s water and energy policies and their market-centric, profit-oriented outlook has further
entrenched the technocratic approach to water (Adaman et al., in press).
Turkey’s recent water development policies aim to maximize the country’s hydropower potential
through developing more small-scale installations and demonstrate a convincing case of water being
demoted to its materiality. These policies, however, have stirred controversy due to the socio-ecological
impacts associated with construction sites, the top-down approach in implementation, and the perception
of graft, cronyism, and corruption. This transformation of Turkish public opinion, which has tradition-
ally been supportive of the state’s water policies, cannot be fully comprehended without reference to
neoliberalization and its implications for water management practices in Turkey. Neoliberalism takes
privatization, commodification, deregulation/reregulation, and competition as its central pillars. As
part of the rise of neoliberal ideology, these pillars have been globally promoted as the best practices
and the commodification of water, based on its material properties as an economic resource, has
found traction across the world (Bakker, 2007).
The neoliberalization of Turkey’s water and energy policies dates back to 1984, when the first legis-
lation initiating privatization in the electricity market was passed (Kibaroglu et al., 2009). In this period,
Turkey was also undergoing an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment program,
which incentivized the neoliberalization process. Consequently, Turkey’s water and hydroelectricity
policies have since centered on ‘the assurance of liberalization and privatization’ which culminated
in Turkey’s transition to a small-scale hydropower policy driven by private sector interests (Kibaroglu
et al., 2009).
In this transition, international financial institutions such as the World Bank have played a significant
role as they expanded carbon markets to developing countries. Turkey became one of the first countries
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Bank’s role ‘in providing climate finance for developing and middle-income countries’ (Eberlein &
Heeb, 2011). The CTF has been a lucrative source of financing for Turkey to expand its renewable
sector, reduce carbon emissions, and open up new markets for renewables (Islar, 2012a). While CTF
loans were intended to support overall renewable development, Turkey has allocated these funds
almost exclusively to energy efficiency and small-scale HPs, which combined account for 56 of the
country’s 62 CTF-funded projects (Eberlein & Heeb, 2011).
The global climate change regime under the Kyoto Protocol, has created new markets for carbon
reduction and introduced new regulatory mechanisms by prioritizing market solutions to cope with
climate change (Erensu, 2013). By acceding to the Kyoto Protocol on developing country status,
Turkey has also been able to benefit from the market mechanisms instituted under the Kyoto regime
(Kaygusuz & Arsel, 2005). As water was a central component of its adaptation to this emerging
regime, Turkey passed legislation to attract both foreign and domestic investors to invest in renewable
energy projects in Turkey, including hydropower. In this regard, an important development was the
passing of Law No. 5346 on Renewables in 2005, wherein the state instituted a critical incentive for
investments through a purchase guarantee for electricity generated through hydropower.
Another driver of the neoliberalization of Turkey’s water policy was its relations with the European
Union (EU). Turkey’s EU accession bid catalyzed the legislative changes and reforms that restructured
its natural resource management schemes and created a competitive energy market, especially within the
hydropower sector, in line with neoliberal mechanisms (Harris & Islar, 2013). As Sirin & Ege (2012)
observe, reform in renewable energy legislation was encouraged by the EU, and led Turkey to commit
itself politically to increasing the share of renewable energy in its energy portfolio. Indeed, the 2001
Law on the Electricity Market, which began Turkey’s spread of small-scale HPs in the country, was
passed to harmonize Turkey’s energy market with EU market conditions (Kaya, 2006).
Furthermore, the 2005 Law on Renewable Energy introduced mechanisms such as eminent domain
rights and purchase guarantees to attract private investment to Turkey’s renewable energy sector. It is
estimated that within a year of the law’s enactment, hydropower constructions quadrupled while the
number of planned HPs doubled (Baris & Kücükali, 2012). These legislative changes and the funds
made available through EU institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB), which gave €135
million to support eight HPs including a mixture of small-scale HPs and large dams in southeast
Turkey (EIB, 2008), have incentivized European companies to actively participate in Turkey’s hydro-
power sector (Harris & Islar, 2013).
In brief, water resource management and energy policies have been shaped by broader ideological
neoliberalist practices, which are widely practiced throughout the small-scale HPs. Neoliberalization
and its implications in global trends, therefore, have reinforced the understanding of water rather as a
material entity or as an economic resource in Turkey.The concepts of hydro-social cycle and environmental justice
The dominant approach to water management construes nature and society as separate entities, and
explores the role of states, technology, and markets in manipulating nature for society’s best benefit
(Scoones et al., 2015). The binary unit of this approach is ‘the hydrological cycle’. Linton (2010) exam-
ines the history of hydrology and discusses how the rise of the discipline devoided water from its
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in the hydrologic cycle’.
There is, however, a burgeoning literature investigating the water-society nexus and seeking to
reinsert water’s social properties into the debate. This literature builds on the concept of the ‘hydro-
social cycle’ which is premised on the inseparability of water and society (Swyngedouw, 2009). The
concept of the hydro-social cycle emphasizes ‘water’s symbolic and material dimensions and has
been used to reveal capital accumulation and inequalities of access to water induced by water manage-
ment practices’ (Fernandez, 2014). Policies premised on the hydrological properties of water have
cohered with the socio-ecological impacts of water resource management practices. Consequently, pol-
icymakers have prioritized technical metrics – like hydroelectricity generated and acres irrigated – at the
expense of potential socio-ecological impacts.
Construing water as a material entity and managing it as an economic resource has critical impli-
cations for issues of socio-economic justice. Scoones et al. (2015) argue that green policies are
legitimated for their contribution to the provision of socio-economic justice, on the conviction that
they lead to a fairer and more equitable distribution of environmental resources. According to the pol-
itical ecology literature, the state-led, techno-centric, and market-oriented approaches in water
management inflict socio-environmental changes that are the main culprit behind social and environ-
mental injustices in the distribution of resources (Swyngedouw, 2007).
The environmental justice literature, which emerged as a broad research agenda, traditionally focused
on the disproportionate allocation of environmental hazards and benefits across society, particularly
within the U.S., where the initial works were predominantly associated with the notion of environmental
racism (Bullard, 2005). Despite its expanding theoretical focus, the concept of environmental justice
takes the distribution of environmental burdens and benefits as its departure point (Schlosberg,
2007). Expanding the concept’s boundaries, Walker (2012) argues that analyses of distributive environ-
mental justice have to also evaluate how environmental policy-making distributes vulnerabilities and
responsibilities, contextualizing how environmental benefits and burdens are allocated among the win-
ners and losers of the policy process. In this context, we utilize three patterns of distributive
environmental justice: (i) burdens and benefits, (ii) vulnerabilities, and (iii) responsibilities, to appraise
the facts and fiction of Turkey’s claims to the socio-environmental justice through its hydropower pol-
icies. The article will demonstrate how distributive environmental justice is vitalized and embedded in
definitions of water in the hydrological and hydro-social cycles. In bridging the concept of the hydro-
social cycle with distributive environmental justice, our main objective is to enrich ‘the social’ dimen-
sion of the hydro-social cycle by endorsing justice dimensions embedded in the cycle (See Figure 1).
The notion of distributive socio-environmental justice has been either subordinated or taken for granted
without sufficient elaboration regarding the hydro-social cycle. We use these merged concepts to elab-
orate on Turkey’s hydropower development policies and show the possibility of explicit integration of
the concept of distributive socio-environmental justice with the hydro-social cycle as a component.Method
We adopt a qualitative methodology, utilizing discourse, mass media, and document analysis to
deconstruct Turkey’s hydropower policies. Empirical evidence has been mainly supplied through six
weeks of fieldwork in the town of Fethiye and the Kargi-Yaniklar villages (May 2014 and October
Fig. 1. Modification of the hydro-social cycle when socio-environmental justice is added as a component (based on Linton &
Budds, 2014).
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during these field visits. Also included in field interviews were engineers from DSI’s regional office
in Fethiye as well as activists and environmental lawyers engaged with the Kargi-Yaniklar HP. Outside
the field, the authors also drew from interviews with corporate representatives from business interests
involved in HPs and high ranking bureaucrats at the DSI’s national headquarters in Ankara, whose com-
ments helped to bridge the narratives and practices on the local and national levels. Additional
information came from legal documents, statistical data sheets, annual reports, and similar resources
released by various agencies of Turkey’s water bureaucracy.
Case study: Kargi-Yaniklar small-scale HP
Each HP results in a unique set of socio-spatial transformations, shaped by its historical, geographical,
and technical particularities. Consequently, each case study would reveal different forms, levels, and
patterns of socio-environmental distribution. This paper seeks to illustrate how hydropower develop-
ment alters patterns of distribution and affects socio-environmental justice by focusing on a
particular case study from Turkey – the Kargi-Yaniklar HP in Turkey’s Western Mediterranean
region, one of nearly 1,500 HPs under development in the country (see Figure 2). This region stretches
across Turkey’s Mediterranean coastline in the Taurus Mountains, which give the region a high
Fig. 2. Kargi-Yaniklar Basin and HPs. Source: http://geodata.ormansu.gov.tr/.
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resort towns, which have high electricity demand in summer, while the region’s hinterland is comprised
of small, agrarian communities. The dual benefits from irrigation and electricity generation have made
the region one of the focal points of Turkey’s small-scale hydropower policy with hundreds of HPs in
planning or under construction. Whereas the HPs in the Black Sea region have received attention in
scholarly studies (Eryilmaz, 2012; Islar, 2012a; Erensu, 2013), there is not a comparable body of litera-
ture that systematically surveys the HPs in the Western Mediterranean. This deficit is especially relevant
considering that the Mediterranean Basin is designated as a ‘biodiversity hotspot’ by the International
Union for Conservation of Nature. Such zones are often habitats of endemic or endangered species, sub-
ject to national legal conservation schemes (e.g. national parks, special environmental protection areas,
etc.), and are under the purview of the 1976 Barcelona Convention.
The Kargi-Yaniklar HP was being developed on the Kargi brook in Turkey’s southwestern region on
the Mediterranean (see Figure 2 and Table 1). The project is situated close to the resort town of Fethiye,
an eco-tourism hotspot that hosts more than a dozen five-star hotels and draws over half a million tour-
ists every year. Surrounding Fethiye is a number of agrarian communities with citrus and olive groves as
well as vegetable fields. The arable land cultivated by the communities is irrigated using canals from the
brook. Furthermore, the brook’s small basin is also significant for its Liquidambar orientalis trees – an
endemic and endangered species – as well as pine and plane forests.
A 1.5 MW HP is currently under development on the basin’s Kargi brook, which originates at the
Banlica plateau on the 2,354-metre high Akdag Mountain. The Akdag Mountain is also a designated
‘special environment protection area’ due to its biodiversity. Therefore, it is perfectly suited to assess
the social, economic, and ecological impact of Turkey’s small-scale HPs. Such a case study also affords
an opportunity to observe how these projects’ effects on the hydro-social cycle alter patterns of distri-
butive socio-environmental justice.
Between 2011 and 2014, the locals of the basin mobilized a series of public protests against the
planned HP which they took to court. In 2014, the locals successfully argued their case and won an
Table 1. General features of Kargi-Yaniklar HP.
HPs status
Level of
Opposition Environmental Status of the Basin
General Features of the Basin and
Local Communities
Kargi-
Yaniklar
HPs
1.5 MW capacity of
electricity
generation
Initiated in 2009 and
court stopped the
construction in
2011
High Reproduction corridor of an
endemic species, Liquidambar
orientalis and the basin is part
of a Special Environment
Protection Area
A popular tourist destination
Fertile agricultural lands
Recreational area
Relatively larger settlements with
more socio-economic
opportunities
Kargi Stream is the most
important freshwater source of
the basin and socio-economic
activities of local communities
over-depend on it
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(Demir, 2011).
The concept of environmental justice is inherently expressed by its distributive aspects, seeking to
identify the appropriate distribution of environmental benefits and burdens across society (Schlosberg,
2007). Building on this notion, Walker (2012) suggests that environmental justice should account for the
distribution of not only benefits and burdens but also vulnerabilities resulting from responsibilities
assumed in the making of environmental policy. Following these three patterns – benefits and burdens,
vulnerabilities, and responsibility – in the Kargi-Yaniklar case, it is thus possible to trace how hydro-
power policy shapes outcomes of socio-environmental (in)justice.
Benefits and burdens. The main benefit from the project – as illustrated in the official documents,
expert statements, and field interviews – was hydropower generation. Two interviewees at the DSI’s
regional office, for example, only mentioned the project’s contribution to the national grid. Hydropower
generation also featured prominently in the locals’ discussion of the project. That alone, however, was
not a sufficient benefit to win over the locals. The former head of Kargi village, for example, noted
‘1.5 MW electricity [referring to the capacity of that HP] cannot even meet the electricity demand of
this village’. For a community that built its life and livelihood around that brook, the benefits associated
with the project were not suffıcient to shoulder its burden, especially considering the potential impact
from the construction on tourism, agriculture, and the environment.
Indeed, the field interviews reflect how the socio-economic and environmental risks associated with
the project’s construction and operation loomed large in the locals’ minds and mobilized their opposi-
tion. For example, the local interviewees pointed at the potential toll the project is going to take on their
mode of living. One local bemoaned ‘families take their children to swim during picnics’ at the upstream
site the project was slated to be constructed on. She also deplored, as did other local interviewees, the
damage the construction is going to inflict on the village and its surroundings. Another source of worry
was the adverse effect on the local economy. The villagers relied on agriculture, fishing, and eco-tour-
ism for their livelihood – the damage from the construction and the diversion of the river would
potentially affect all of these activities and therefore risk their economic well-being.
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in the legal proceedings. The construction was expected to result in significant deforestation, which would
have a tangible impact on the environment. In our interview, the former head of Kargi village bewailed
that the constructors had already cut down ‘approximately 800 pine trees’ to open a road to the upstream
construction site. Comparing the trees to the region’s lungs, the village head likened the construction to a
‘cancer in the lungs of the region’. Deforestation not only indicated a loss of the region’s pristine nature,
which was a source of revenue through eco-tourism, but it was also potentially going to reduce air quality,
affecting the locals’ lives. Since the diversion of the river was going to change the soilwater levels, the
locals were also worried that the deforestation effect would last beyond the construction.
Particularly worrisome was the fate of the region’s endemic and endangered Liquidambar orientalis.
The environmental assessment reports and expert testimonies that resulted in an injunction from Turkey’s
highest administrative court – Council of State (Danistay) – provided a detailed list of the environmental
risks associated with the project. The Council of State’s final decision, however, especially emphasized the
threat to Liquidambar orientalis, already endangered due to anthropogenic reasons. The Council of State’s
decision highlighted that the region represents a vulnerable ecosystem, that the Kargi brook is the basin’s
major water source, and that its diversion would have adverse implications for a region that is already
designated as a ‘special environment protection area’ by law. After these assertions, the decision devoted
a lengthy section to the Liquidambar orientalis, the imperative to and conditions necessary for its preser-
vation, and the potential risk the construction posed to the species. As expressed in the decision, the
proposed construction site and the brook’s banks comprised the majority of the region’s Liquidambar
orientalis population since these are the only areas with phreatic groundwater levels sufficiently high
for the species to maintain their lifespan. Alluding to Turkey’s commitment to protect endemic species
under the Convention on the Conservation of Wildlife and Natural Habitats (also known as the Bern Con-
vention), the Council concluded the project posed an undue threat to an environment exhibiting a
characteristically Mediterranean flora and fauna, and hosting a roster of endemic or endangered species.
The expert report similarly pointed at adverse risks like changes to soil salinity, phreatic groundwater, ero-
sion, forestation, and animal populations, some of which may irreversibly damage the region’s ecosystem.
It was on the basis of this assessment that the Council issued an injunction halting the project and as its
assessment reflects, the Kargi-Yaniklar HP was a typical example of how hydropower policies designed
and implemented in a top-down fashion, with utilitarian concerns, and from a technocratic perspective pass
environmental burdens and risks unfairly to the local communities.
Vulnerabilities. Locals interviewed in the basin contended that the HP would divert the river’s water in
ways that would reduce their access and render them vulnerable to erratic flow patterns. One local inter-
viewee pointed out ‘the amount of water had already been decreasing’ and that ‘the [HP] would only
make things worse’. The locals were particularly aggrieved by the potential impact the project was
going to have on their access to water, describing it as ‘disastrous’. In the words of one interviewee,
‘we rely on water [for] our crops, our bread [and] people are already struggling to earn a living
[which will only become worse with the HP]’. On the other hand, the former head of the village
said that the villages had already experienced serious problems regarding the management of irrigation
systems and provision of irrigation water. In his view, the HP was going to exacerbate these problems as
‘[the project] would affect the availability of irrigation water and likely limit our irrigation activities’.
Other locals similarly remarked that the project ‘would damage the stream’ and ‘destroy the natural
beauty fed by the stream’. This was another source of vulnerability which was likely to adversely
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income from eco-tourism.
Other locals – especially women – pointed out that the basin was integral to their socialization. The
proposed construction site and the brook’s banks were fields where the locals gathered for picnics,
feasts, and village events. The planned project spelled their doom. In the words of one local ‘these rec-
reational areas and the activities around them are essential parts of those people’s lives, you cannot just
take them away from them’.
Indeed, several interviewees expressed concern that the project would compel locals to emigrate from
their localities. ‘These people already expect more jobs, more amenities and social opportunities’ said
one interviewee, ‘when they are not feeling assured about their future and their living conditions are
threatened, emigration becomes the only possibility for most’. Another interviewee echoed the same
sentiment: ‘If there is no water, there is no life. If there is no water, you cannot practice agriculture,
you cannot plant fruit trees. Then, what are you going to do? You will have to emigrate’. As the remarks
illustrate, the vulnerabilities the HP created in the form of reduced access to water, negative impact on
livelihoods, and limited social opportunities posed a potentially existential threat to these communities,
indicating another instance of socio-environmental injustice.
Responsibilities. A third aspect to look at is the distribution of responsibilities. The local interviewees
unanimously believed that the company would benefit disproportionately from the project as it was
granted water use rights for 49 years whereas the locals were almost totally excluded from the
decision-making process. This asymmetry aggrieved the locals as they perceived it an unfair appropria-
tion of a resource that collectively belongs to and benefits them for the benefit of a corporate interest:
It is important who owns the water. The beneficiary of the process is obvious: the company. The
locality would not benefit from the process. We want projects which may improve the locale, we
do not want outsiders [referring to the companies] to get all of the benefits.
Other interviewees questioned the company’s intentions, contending that it is oblivious to the toll the
project is going to take on the locality, ‘the electricity to be produced here will not even meet the pro-
ject’s cost’, said one interviewee; ‘the intention is to obtain profit from the water, it has nothing to do
benefiting us, benefiting the region at all’. Another interviewee similarly argued that project was simply
a politically-connected corporate interest reaping profits from state’s coffers and at their expense: ‘I do
not believe this [HP] is about producing electricity. It is too small to even meet the energy demand of
this village. It is all for the profit from privatization’.
One reason feeding these suspicions was the ‘closed, rather secret processes’ followed by the com-
pany and the State in the project’s application and approval process – a secrecy criticized even by an
interviewee who supported the project. The secrecy had convinced the locals that the project prioritized
the corporate interests over theirs. Echoing the same sentiment, one interviewee remarked:
These projects are generally negotiated between the companies and the State in secrecy, with an aim
to increase profits of the companies. We know that the ruling party’s MP here acts as a mediator for
the companies seeking to construct hydropower projects in this region…They [policymakers] are only
after their personal gains from these projects. They could not care less about the locals, about the
nature.
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The discourses surrounding water management practices reflect social power relations while revealing
how water is defined and mediated by the different stakeholders (Mehta, 2014). Studies like Islar (2012b),
Erensu (2013) and Adaman et al. (in press) have sought to empirically study the power structures
embedded in Turkey’s hydropower policies in the recent years. Islar (2012b) revealed the interplay of
two competing conceptualizations of water in Turkey’s water policy by contrasting the technocratic dis-
course embraced by politicians, bureaucrats, and the private sector, which contrast with the socio-political
discourse espoused by activists, conservationists, and hydropower opponents. Building on Islar’s work,
we trace these discourses as reified and reproduced at the local and national levels, and demonstrate
how water mediates power relations that define patterns of socio-environmental injustice. A leitmotif in
Turkey’s hydropower discourse, especially at the national level, is the rhetoric of ‘water flowing idly
by’ (Milliyet, 2005). Cabinet ministers and water bureaucrats commonly characterize water not utilized
for energy or irrigation as having flown idly by or in other words, as having been wasted. In this rhetoric,
water is reduced to its utility, either as generating electricity or as irrigating fields (Radikal, 2009). Such an
exclusive focus on water’s economic utility, however, abstracts it from its socio-ecological dimensions,
especially in communities where it is the lynchpin of a certain mode of living.
This political rhetoric that essentializes water’s economic utility is also pervaded by nationalistic under-
tones. Hydropower is regularly trumpeted as a ‘national’ resource and a means to reducing Turkey’s energy
dependency (Radikal, 2010; Hurriyet, 2012; Yeni Akit, 2013). While praising the recent surge in Turkey’s
hydropower investments, for example, a cabinet minister played a pun on the Turks’ self-deprecating idiom
‘water flows, the Turk watches it’ and remarked that with the recent surge in Turkey’s hydropower invest-
ments, the idiom is now reversed to ‘water flows, the Turk constructs’ (Milliyet, 2011). This emphasis on
‘national’ capabilities, reversed cultural stereotypes, and the ‘achievements’ of Turkish engineering and
entrepreneurship also reproduce a discourse that has persisted through the history of Turkishmodernization.
With the rise of the climate change agenda, this discourse has also gained a new dimension with hydro-
power being promoted as a ‘national’ renewable energy source (Yeni Akit, 2013).
The aforementioned political rhetoric was also reflected in the remarks of the DSI engineers inter-
viewed for this study, all of whom described water as ‘a source of clean energy’, ‘a national
resource’, and a necessary means for reducing the country’s fossil-fuel energy dependency. The
DSI’s annual reports exhibit a similar language, with strong references to water scarcity and drought
problems and an emphasis on hydropower construction as the solution (DSI, 2014b). Consistent with
these notions, the water bureaucracy encourages private sector participation in the hydropower sector.
Consequently, the private sector’s rhetoric becomes very similar to the water bureaucracy’s technocratic
and utilitarian conceptualization of water:
Our rivers (in the Black Sea region and Eastern Anatolia) flow from high slopes and end up in frequent
floods. We have to discipline all the rivers. For example, when you construct a regulator, you actually
build a wall. I wish to see more dams…The speed of water should be slowed down by the dams, which
are all beneficial in that sense. By means of dams, we are also able to produce clean energy.
These accounts converge a certain conceptualization of water based on its economic utility which
defines a certain approach to its politics on the assumption of an optimal technique or technology
whereby water can be managed for maximal societal utility (Scoones et al., 2015).
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opposition to HPs in Turkey, especially at the local level. This discourse opposes neoliberal orthodoxy
like privatization, deregulation, and private sector participation. It characterizes the impact of this neo-
liberal orthodoxy in a language of authoritarianism, as reflected in its popular slogans like ‘let the
brooks flow freely’ and ‘stop the brook massacre’. Against the technocratic approach’s utilitarian
emphasis on material and quantifiable benefits, this discourse highlights immaterial and socio-political
losses like the environmental impact and distributive environmental injustices (e.g. access and avail-
ability) (Hamsici, 2010). It is worth noting that this alternative discourse is not premised in a
systematic opposition to technology but rather on an alternative narrative of science that casts doubt
on the technocratic discourse’s claim to legitimacy through scientific objectivity. A point observed in
our fieldwork, for example, was how the locals invoked science to legitimize their own arguments, edu-
cated themselves on the scientific arguments against hydropower development, and sought to engage
like-minded academics in their movement. By this token, the socio-political discourse does not repudiate
science but posits the multidimensionality of water as a scientific fact. These discursive interactions
between different stakeholders revealed the social power relations embodied in Turkey’s hydropower
policies. The technocratic approach empowered politicians, bureaucratic institutions, and the private
sector as the actors for driving hydropower policy. In this regard, they were also aided by international
actors like global credit institutions (e.g. IMF and the World Bank), the EU, and the post-Kyoto climate
regime which facilitated the diffusion of neoliberal orthodoxy into national policies. With the spread of
this market-centric, profit-oriented approach, the utilitarian conceptualization of water became the norm
– in Turkey and across the world – and consolidated the dominant position of these actors.
As Petras & Veltmayer (2001) describe, ‘neoliberalism engenders a significant increase in inequality
between the minority within the globalist loop and those exploited by it’. On the Turkish side, the losers
of this transformation were the locals who were excluded from the process whereby the policies that had
a tangible impact on their lives and livelihoods were designed and implemented, as if they were deemed
dispensable for the sake of ‘national’ interests. This perception of exclusion and marginalization, how-
ever, redefined power relations as it mobilized the local – and the public opinion – in opposition to
hydropower and in a handful of cases – including the case study in this paper – managed to block
the HPs. Consequently, it is affirmed that water and the policies it is managed by cannot be understood
in isolation from their socio-political context and patterns of distributive socio-environmental justice.Conclusion
In recent years, Turkey has transitioned from large-scale HPs undertaken by the State to small-scale
HPs driven by the private sector. Turkey’s hundreds of small-scale hydropower plants in operation or
under construction have a significant contribution to the country’s electricity generation. These projects,
however, are also important for their social and environmental consequences, especially at the local
level. Deconstructing the discourses surrounding this pivot from the perspective of the hydro-social
cycle, this paper has sought to explain the various levels at which Turkey’s recent hydropower policies
are altering patterns of distributive socio-environmental justice.
Turkey’s politicians, bureaucratic institutions, and the private sector designed and implemented the
country’s hydropower policies in a top-down fashion, with utilitarian concerns, and mainly from a tech-
nocratic perspective. This approach of restricting water to its economic utility, derived from hydrological
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how water management practices affect lives and livelihoods at the local level.
The changes in Turkey’s hydropower policies, enabled by the rise of neoliberalism at the global level and
its diffusion into national legislation through international financial institutions, the EU, and the post-Kyoto
regime, altered the existing power relations. Neoliberal orthodoxy, combined with the financial incentives
presented by the emergence of a new carbon economy, empowered a state-private sector alliance circumvent-
ing and excluding existing beneficiaries (i.e. locals and the environment), a dynamic perfectly illustrated in
the Kargi-Yaniklar HP which is analyzed as a case study in this paper. The locals’ opposition in the field as
well as in the courtroom, which managed to successfully block the Kargi-Yaniklar HP, signified the emer-
gence of a counterweight to the state-private sector alliance’s hegemonic role. This conflict also reflected a
contrast between competing conceptualizations of water and how water mediates actors espousing them.
Water can assume a roster of material and also immaterial meanings. It can be a source of energy, a
means of sustenance, a cause of popular mobilization, an instrument of power, and a symbol of nationalism
all at once. It can create opportunities and it can create threats. It is not possible to trace the power relations it
embodies without following these transformations and observing water’s socio-political context. Inherent in
this context are patterns of socio-environmental justice. Following three patterns of socio-environmental dis-
tribution – benefits and burdens, vulnerabilities, and responsibility – it is thus possible to trace how
hydropower policy shapes outcomes of socio-environmental (in)justice.
Technocratic approaches prioritize technical metrics – like hydroelectricity generated and acres irri-
gated – at the expense of the socio-ecological impacts, and fail to appreciate the social and political
contexts each HP is inserted into. As illustrated in the Kargi-Yaniklar case study, this conflict can
even result in the marginalized communities successfully mobilizing to block hydropower develop-
ments. Therefore, to develop practices that result in a fairer and more equitable distribution of
environmental resources, policy planners have to embrace inclusive, transparent processes that appreci-
ate water’s dual meanings as both a chemical compound and a social component.Acknowledgements
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